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Emergence of Market Orders: Audience Interaction and Vanguard Influence 
 
Abstract 
Research in the sociology of markets finds that shared meanings facilitate valuation and 
exchange by providing frameworks for perceiving and evaluating products and producers. 
Whereas studies of local sensemaking explain how meanings emerge in market 
interaction and macro sociological accounts explain how meanings embodied in 
conventions, structures, and institutions are used in markets, understanding of the links 
between these two levels of analyses remains underdeveloped. In this paper, we propose 
a theory of how engagement and influence at the micro level gives rise to conventional 
labels and categories. Our theory proposes three processes through which audiences in 
markets come to share meanings: i. through interaction among the audience, ii. through 
influence of vanguard audience members on lay audiences, and iii. through vanguard 
influence on authorities. We investigate some of the propositions on label use and 
category differentiation in 23 product categories on eBay.  
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Introduction  
Sociological studies reveal that the existence of a stable market requires some minimal 
consensus about how a good is defined, who can trade it, and how trading is conducted 
(Zelizer, 1979; Smith, 1989, 2007; Kennedy, Lo, Lounsbury 2010). Shared meanings that 
are embodied in labels, categories, standards, metrics, and evaluation tools are integral to 
markets, including markets for equity, labor, commodity, and consumer goods (Callon, 
1998; Espeland and Stevens, 1998; Carruthers and Stinchcombe, 1999; Rosa, Porac, 
Runser-Spanjol, and Saxon, 1999; Favereau, Biencourt, and Eymard-Duvernay, 2002; 
MacKenzie and Millo, 2003; Beunza and Garud, 2007). Divergence in the meanings that 
guide perceptions, comparisons, and decision-making contributes to volatility in prices 
(Shiller, 1990; Zuckerman, 2004) and disorder in markets (MacKenzie, 2011). 
Sociological theories about the emergence of shared meanings divide by level of 
analysis. According to micro-level theories of sensemaking and social construction, 
meaning arises from interactions through a collective effort. In this view, meanings are 
shared because they are jointly created (Weick, 1979; Rosa et al., 1999; Smith 2007). 
Order emerges locally, and consensus about meaning is fleeting, tenuous, and plastic. 
According to macro-sociological theories, participants, faced with coordination 
problems during exchange, derive shared meaning from the structural, institutional, and 
cultural embeddedness of markets (Fligstein, 2001; Beckert, 2009, 2010). In this view, 
consensual meanings reside in macrostructures and remain uniform and stable so long as 
the macrostructures persist. Order arises as actors refer to the same structures.  
Despite extensive research at each of these two levels of analysis, theory on links 
between local sensemaking and the global spread of meanings remain underdeveloped. 
Some research sees sensemaking as an explanation of cognitive embedding in markets at 
large (Kennedy, 2008; Khaire and Wadhwani, 2010). However, sensemaking theories 
cannot explain market consensus unless most market participants interact with each other 
– an unlikely assumption in large markets. Other research that aims to link the two levels 
sees local meaning in markets as being derived from socio-structural, institutional, and 
cultural embeddedness of markets (Beckert, 2009). Both approaches can be criticized for 
conflating social interaction with social structure and thereby overlooking inequalities of 
power and influence in markets (see Gemici (2012) for a more elaborated discussion).  
In this paper, we address this gap by developing a theory of the emergence and 
development of shared meanings (at the market level) from engagement and influence (at 
the micro level). Our theory also addresses variations in the engagement of audience 
members in the construction of meaning. Micro-level studies portray all market actors as 
active participants in the collective effort of meaning emergence. Macro-level work, in 
contrast, draws a sharp distinction between a vanguard of influential producers and 
intermediaries, and the passive “lay” audience. These studies show how producers and 
intermediaries actively promote and disseminate particular categorical frameworks (Porac, 
Thomas, Wilson, Paton, and Kanfer, 1995; Kennedy, 2005; Rao, Monin, and Durand, 
2003; Lounsbury and Rao, 2004; Anteby, 2010; Negro, Hannan, and Rao, 2010). 
Producers also form interest groups and associations to establish quality standards tied to 
categories and lobby authorities or media to endorse certain classification systems 
(Lounsbury and Rao 2004; Zhao, 2005; Weber et al., 2008; Bogaert, Boone, and Carroll, 
2010). We bridge these perspectives by considering how meanings can be shared either 
through decentralized interactions among the audience or through the influence of 
vanguards on lay audiences.   
We first review studies on the origin of meaning in markets. We then elaborate on 
three mechanisms of convergence of meanings at the collective market level and develop 
propositions that relate patterns of audience participation to the emergence of market 
conventions. We use data from multiple markets on eBay to investigate some of these 
implications. Though not a conclusive test of causality, the associations we find support 
our arguments. Our analysis also shows that comparative, multi-market studies can 
advance our understanding of the origin of market orders.  
 
Consensus in Markets and Sensemaking in Micro Situations 
Market order depends on the existence of shared conventions. Conventions allow 
participants to perceive the ambiguous stimuli found in markets as a recognizable 
situation consisting of goods, their producers/sellers, and a set of potential 
buyers/consumers. Such recognition precedes the resolution of problems of valuation, 
cooperation, and competition (Beckert, 2009).  
We follow Lewis (2002 [1969]) in treating conventions as supported by common 
knowledge that aligns the expectations of agents. Unlike Lewis (2002 [1969]), we 
conceptualize commonality of knowledge, or the degree of consensus, as being variable
1
.  
The greater the market-level consensus, the greater will be the overlap among repertoires 
of meanings that agents bring to a random situation, and the greater will be the likelihood 
that they reach an agreement about the definition of the situation. 
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 This is different from Lewis’s (2002[1969]) degree of conventionality, which depends on 
expectations of others’ conformity. He assumes common knowledge.   
This focus on consensus invites two key questions: how do meanings originate in 
the unstructured case where there is no prior meaning, and how do they become 
consensual? Previous empirical studies of markets suggest that market understandings 
emerge and diffuse through story telling: stories told by consumers through venues such 
as product reviews and by producers through press releases and product brochures 
provide opportunities for the creation and dissemination of shared meanings (Rosa et al., 
2005; Kennedy, 2008; Navis and Glynn, 2010; Wry, Lounsbury, and Glynn, 2011; Fiol 
and Romanelli, 2012). Similarly, descriptions of artworks in auction catalogs and 
websites allow participants to account for value of art works (Khaire and Wadhwani, 
2010). 
Not just stories, but potentially all interactions can become sensemaking episodes. 
As Weick (1979) theorizes, sensemaking begins with an actor enacting her conception of 
a situation. As one person enacts interpretations and labels, interaction partners accept, 
reject or modify them. In turn, the first actor abandons, revises, or maintains her initial 
interpretation. Similarly, Lewis (2002 [1969]) argues that solutions to novel coordination 
problems emerge through agreement (by communication or displays of conforming 
action), luck, or by actors picking salient alternatives.  Both theorists suggest the key unit 
of analysis is the micro situation in which agents interact. 
Following their lead, we identify participants’ diverse engagements with the 
market as occasions for meaning enactment. Engagements can involve asking for a price, 
sampling merchandise, haggling, enquiring about various qualities, purchasing, 
consuming, and displaying goods (Douglas and Isherwood, 1979; Smith, 1989; 
McCracken, 1990; Spillman, 1999). They include interactions with other individuals, 
with organizations, or with outputs such as product descriptions, product reviews, and 
company reports (Preda, 2009). 
Agents engaged in a market with other actors are motivated to coordinate their 
actions (Lewis, 1969 [2002]; Schelling, 1978), make their worlds more orderly by 
resolving ambiguity (Weick, 1979), and identify a compromise that serves their common 
interest (Boltanski and Thevenot, 2006). In an effort to align their accounts and actions, 
they seek to understand how other participants make sense of things and form higher-
order expectations about others’ expectations (Smith, 2007). Convergence of meanings 
thus arises at the micro level due to interdependence.  
Of course, by convergence we do not necessarily mean complete consensus in 
meanings. In markets, order often prevails despite lack of full consensus. Aversion to 
equivocality within interaction generally causes agents to settle for a focal point that 
works (i.e., a plausible interpretation of the situation that allows them to coordinate) 
rather than search for an optimal convention within each situation (Weick et al., 2005). 
Interacting participants look for meanings in their individual repertoires that can be 
applied to particular situations. If agents’ meaning repertoires do not suffice individually 
for coordination, they might suffice collectively. Therefore, it is sufficient that there exist 
applicable meanings in some part of a market, not everywhere.  
Zelditch’s (2001, Zelditch and Floyd, 1998) work on legitimation suggests two 
additional reasons why full consensus is unnecessary for market order. First, any market 
situation demands that multiple elements be defined, such as the product and its attributes. 
Agreement of participants about some but not all elements might be sufficient for 
performing the desired action (evaluation, transaction). In negotiated situations, agents 
may exploit disagreements regarding different elements as bargaining chips, eventually 
reaching sufficient agreement. Some dissensus may even be desirable because it enables 
flexibility and creativity (Boltanski and Thevenot, 2006; Stark, 2009; Huault and 
Rainelli-Weiss, 2011). Such collaborative definitions of situations are more likely if 
agents perceive their own meaning repertoires to be incomplete.   
For example, in Appendix 1.1, eBay participants in the “coin” chat room point out 
that authoritative sources differ on the criteria for rating Liberty coins, indicating that 
there is less than full consensus. They note that people might be motivated to offer 
different evaluations depending on whether they are buying or selling, and that these 
evaluations would be negotiated along with price. At the end of the chat sequence, they 
agree that the divergence in criteria concerns a nuance that often will not greatly affect 
quality classification. We see partial and amicable convergence in understandings in this 
example. The participants recognize that they would use their preferred criterion along 
with their skills of examination to make a final judgment in each situation.  
Second, agents need not believe in the propriety of conventions to use them. 
Supporting this idea, Bowker and Star (1999) note that standards and categories converge, 
even as their users may not internalize them. They recount the example of psychoanalysts 
who, despite not endorsing the biochemistry based classifications of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, use its categories as a shorthand to communicate 
with one another.  
In market situations, too, use of conventions might be purely instrumental. Even 
when labels are contested for reasons of efficacy, aesthetics, or politics, participants keep 
using them to carry on their transactions, all the while negotiating application and 
meanings (Fine, 2004). Thus, agreement within a local situation means that mutual 
expectations and orientations are assumed to be similar enough to conduct a transaction 
and does not necessarily imply internalization or advocacy. 
As our overview indicates, theories of how meaning emerges in micro interaction 
are quite advanced. And while theorists do not analyze how locally emergent meanings 
become conventional or come to be stored in social structures, they do recognize that 
meanings in local interaction are sometimes derived from macro structures. For example, 
not only do people make sense from and enact a certain social position and identity, but 
they also have an awareness of the social positions and identities of those with whom 
they interact (Weick, 1979). Institutions prime and edit sensemaking by activating 
identities, roles, and frames that guide action and evaluation of others’ action (Weber and 
Glynn, 2006).  
Making the link to macrostructures even more obvious, definitions of what lies in 
the domain of a market are embedded in societal institutions (Polanyi, 1944). Historically 
and contextually varying organizations, institutions, and norms shape cognition in 
markets (Zelizer, 1979; Fligstein, 2001; Bourdieu, 2005; Carruthers, 2005; Jones et al., 
2012). Actors draw upon institutionally established frames of meaning, called orders of 
worth (Boltanski and Thevenot, 2006) or institutional logics (Friedland and Alford, 1991), 
when making sense of markets. Meanings, therefore, emerge in contexts that are 
relationally and symbolically structured by embedded norms (Lazega and Favereau, 
2002).  
Despite these links to macro structure, questions of how local emergent meanings 
become stable across micro situations and spread throughout a market, and how they 
develop into more complex schemata, remain unaddressed. In the following sections, we 
integrate key ideas underlying the sensemaking approach with Hannan, Pólos, and 
Carroll’s (2007, hereafter HPC) theory of category emergence (also used by Kennedy, Lo, 
and Lounsbury, 2010; Negro, Hannan, and Rao, 2010; Hsu, Hannan, and Pólos, 2011; 
and Fiol and Romanelli, 2012) to develop a theory of how meanings come to be shared, 
how they become conventional, in market contexts. 
 
Validation & Convergence 
In studying the emergence of conventions, we focus on two types of conventions that are 
fundamental for market action: labels and categories. Like other conventions (standards, 
metrics, tools of evaluation), labels and categories are used by market participants to 
make sense of micro situations. Moreover, they likely precede and play a role in the 
emergence of more complex conventions and components of market order such as role 
structures (White, 1981) or hierarchically ordered status orders (Podolny, 1993) among 
producers.   
Market labels include labels for producers, products, and relevant attributes used 
in evaluating goods. Labels are conventional in that participants use them when they can 
presume that others will understand them. Ethnographic studies document the use of 
market-specific labels and idiosyncratic languages. For example, members of many 
auction markets speak in jargon or use signals with meanings obscure to outsiders (Smith, 
1989). Likewise traders in global-currency markets use an idiosyncratic conversational 
system to transact on an electronic interface (Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger, 2002). In 
Appendix 1.2, we observe the importance of market-specific labels from the point of 
view of eBay participants. In this chat-room excerpt, a participant named 
“the_perfect_dark” seeks information about a vintage Egyptian scarf s/he intends to sell. 
Other chat-room participants collectively work to pinpoint the appropriate label for the 
item and warn that trying to sell it without the correct market-specific label could result 
in a bad sale or lack of bids.  
Similarly, in Appendix 1.3, an eBay user discusses the impact that selling in the 
“wrong Ebay category” can have on the value sellers get for their listings. Market 
categories help buyers and sellers negotiate exchange. As “cognitive infrastructures,” 
they provide simplifying frameworks that help sensemaking and joint problem solving 
(Zuckerman, 1999; Hsu, 2006; Hsu et al., 2009; Schneiberg and Berk, 2010). 
Markets are typically structured into category systems: sets of categories, which 
might or might not be nested, that distinguish between the myriad details that define and 
distinguish offerings. Markets differ in their degree of elaboration--the degree to which 
they are further decomposed into subcategories. Such elaboration requires not only 
agreement on a set of labels, but also some agreement on the relation(s) among them, and 
therefore is different from proliferation of labels.  
In the eBay context, different markets vary considerably in the elaboration of their 
categorization systems. For example, the “dolls’’ market has 107 subcategories, based on 
dimensions such as period, manufacturer, artist, material, and character. In contrast, 
“folk-art’’ (a category one could easily imagine being classified into similar 
subcategories) has only one.  
Rosa et al. (2005) show that categories become elaborated as new products are 
introduced into the market. This is driven not just by the existence of variation, but also 
by audience members’ recognition of variation. Subcategories are socially constructed to 
organize and process intra-category variation. Accordingly, we seek to understand 
category elaboration as a function of social processes and not exogenous stimuli.   
We begin our theory development by defining several basic concepts: a market, a 
market audience, and consensual meaning. We then consider three processes through 
which consensus emerges and is elaborated among the various participants in a market. 
(In the Discussion we consider some reasons for expecting that convergence might not 
happen generally despite the operation of these three mechanisms.)  
Basic concepts 
Following HPC 2007, we conceptualize particular conventions of labels and categories as 
being specific to an audience in a market. By “a” market, we refer to the intersection of 
“the” market for a particular class of items (such as crude oil, oranges, or contemporary 
art) and of a particular “marketplace” where market participants meet (face-to-face or 
virtually) at a given point in time. The audience in/of a market is the set of agents that 
play an evaluative role in that market and control resources that matter for the success of 
those who offer products in it. We recognize that agents in markets can occupy the roles 
of audience or producer (seller), sometimes occupying both roles simultaneously or in 
turn, as in the case of insiders (members or employees of producer organizations). 
Our theory operates at the interface of collectively shared meanings (in audiences) 
and local market situations in which audience members participate. We link these two 
levels through cognitions of individual audience members. Each audience member can be 
characterized by her grade of membership in a consensus. This reflects the degree to 
which her understandings match those of other audience members. The degree of 
consensus at the market level reflects the overlap among individual participants’ 
repertoires of meanings. 
Agreement about categories takes two forms. First, there is agreement about the 
extension of the label—the set of products/ producers /attributes to which the label refers. 
When the situation involves an unfamiliar stimulus, agents’ agreement on the application 
of labels to objects is facilitated by an agreement about the intension of the label, its 
meaning. The likelihood that audience members in a marketplace will agree in applying 
labels increases with the degree to which they share a repertoire of labels. Therefore, the 
likelihood of agreement in a randomly chosen situation depends on degree of extensional 
and intensional consensus. 
With these definitions in place, we consider three processes through which 
consensus among a market audience increases. 
Convergence of Meanings Through Engagement  
One way to conceptualize convergence at the market level is directly as a super-position 
of micro level sensemaking that we have outlined above. Previous empirical work that 
focuses on sensemaking through collective stories adopts this approach by assuming that 
published stories and public discussions reveal cognitive structures that are used by all 
market participants (Kennedy, 2008; Khaire and Wadhwani 2010; Bingham and Kahl, 
2013). Research in markets dominated by few agents has also treated the larger market as 
one local situation (Beunza and Garud, 2007). In both cases, collective sensemaking not 
only gives rise to meaning but also accounts for its dissemination across the market.  
We note that while this approach is suitable for analyzing convergence in small 
work groups or organizations (Stigliani and Ravasi, 2012), it is not suitable for markets 
where many market participants never directly interact. Therefore, we take a two-step 
approach, theorizing first about the convergence of an audience member’s repertoire to 
that of the others with whom she interacts in a local market. We elaborate on processes of 
experiential and vicarious learning through market engagement. Next, we argue that 
collective consensus develops as a convergence of individual repertoires that are enacted 
across different market situations.  
The solutions audience members have found to past coordination problems, or 
their previous sensemaking experience, constitute precedents for later episodes (Lewis, 
2002 [1969]). As Kennedy, Lo, and Lounsbury (2010, p. 375) note, “[a]udience members 
iteratively refine their understanding of a category label with each usage they encounter 
by hypothesizing about the recurring patterns that relate labels for defining synonyms, 
instances, and attributes.” Upon agreeing with an exchange partner about the definition 
and application of labels and categories, their first-order and second-order expectations 
about meanings are affirmed.  
When an agent’s enactment of meanings is contested, she is challenged to revise 
her meaning repertoire. Whether she can reach an agreement with her partner or not, she 
gets exposed to a new label/category or novel application of ones in her existing 
repertoire. This expands her repertoire. In cases where the partner had a higher typicality 
(grade of membership) in the consensus, the focal actor’s typicality in the consensus 
increases as well. When the newly acquired application of the existing label/category 
does not belong to the evolving consensus, the focal actor’s typicality does not increase. 
As long as new meanings do not displace old ones, typicality does not decline as a result 
of individual learning.  
In our conceptualization, market engagement includes observation of other agents’ 
interactions (i.e., vicarious learning). If the observed alters agree and the focal agent finds 
their repertoires to be congruent with her own, then the affirmative value on her meaning 
repertoire is greater. When they disagree with each other or with the focal agent, the 
observer is more likely to revise her repertoire. Engagement with market artifacts, such as 
product descriptions, guides, consumer reports, and price lists, also occasion vicarious 
learning. Such artifacts embody meanings created in previous interactions (Preda, 2009). 
In these instances, revisions to the repertoire are more likely to increase the focal actor’s 
grade of membership in the consensus, because what gets embodied in artifacts is more 
likely to be closer to the core of an evolving/existing consensus.  
As agents continue to engage with the market, they might then draw upon the new 
label or category they have learned if they deem it useful for coordinating with their new 
exchange partners. Because agents are motivated to come up with a working definition in 
each micro situation, and because meanings might be used instrumentally without regard 
to personal views of their propriety, expansion of repertoires through previous 
engagements implies greater likelihood of using labels and categories that are part of the 
consensus.  
Proposition 1. As they engage more with the market, audience members become 
more likely to use the labels and categories that are part of the market consensus.  
 
Producers, too, can engage with the market as audience members. As producers 
increase their engagement and grade of membership in the audience consensus, they 
should find it easier to appeal to other audience members as sellers.  
Proposition 2. The offerings of sellers who engage more with the market as a 
member of the audience will have greater appeal for the audience.  
 We move from individual to collective level by conceptualizing audiences as 
aggregations of individual actors. Individual actors play two key functions in the 
emergence of shared meanings: i. enacting interpretations and ii. carrying a repertoire of 
meanings accumulated over previous experiences of sensemaking from one engagement 
to another. These dual functions, together with the conjecture that grades of membership 
increase with engagement, means that meanings converge in an audience even when all 
of its members do not directly interact. An experimental study by Malt and Sloman 
(2004) illustrates the spread of new labels across different sets of interaction 
partners. After a confederate introduced a new label to a study subject during a 
collaborative task, the subject was likely to carry and apply the new label in a subsequent 
task with a new interaction partner.  As a result, subsequent subjects adopted labels 
introduced by the confederate despite never having interaction with him or her.  
Thus, the repeated engagement of an individual in a market not only increases her 
grade of membership in its consensus, but it also contributes to the consensus by carrying 
meanings to other participants. This effect will be stronger if participants interact with 
different others each time they engage in the market. As more potential combinations of 
pairs of individual actors are realized, meanings will diffuse faster.  
As a label or category gets used, it becomes increasingly salient and cognitively 
accessible to market actors (Hsu and Elsbach 2013). Repeated engagement by the same 
individuals thus makes it more likely that the same meanings will be re-enacted across 
different sensemaking episodes, increasing the rate at which a consensus emerges.  
Persistent use of labels and categories by market participants also constrains other 
actors who transact with them. According to Rosa and Spanjol (2005), once a consensus 
has formed, category descriptions disappear from stories because they become default 
assumptions. Newcomers are not exposed to alternative categories, but simply learn and 
adopt the dominant ones as part of their socialization.  
The emergence of conventions can also be facilitated by consciousness of a 
developing consensus. As meanings become consensual, individuals have a greater 
incentive to learn them in order to facilitate coordination. Together, these lines of 
reasoning suggest that higher intensity engagement by the average market participant 
increases the level of consensus.  
Proposition 3. Audience consensus about a label increases with the average 
intensity of audience engagement. 
 
 Audience engagement likely affects not just the degree of meaning consensus, but 
also the nature of shared meanings. In particular, common labels become more elaborated 
when the convergence in understandings is more complete. This argument goes back to 
Hume (1854 [1752]), who maintained that those more experienced with art works and 
genres make finer distinctions among them. Becker (1982) also found that sustained 
engagement allows experienced members of the audience to develop greater awareness of 
the myriad details associated with the production, display, and interpretation of art works. 
Mitchell and Dacin (1996) review research which shows that a similar dynamic 
characterizes market contexts: more engaged audience members develop more refined 
understandings of the patterns of feature values associated with the label as well as of the 
distinctions among the offerings.  
An important form of label elaboration involves the development of agreement 
about subcategories. These finer typifications emerge when audience members perceive 
distinct clusters of producers nested within a category label, label these, and come to 
agreement about their meaning. As we noted above, more engaged audience members 
generally detect and code finer shades of variation within classes and categories. It 
follows from the foregoing argument that differentiation of subtypes will increase with 
audience engagement. 
Proposition 4. The hazard of subcategory creation within a category increases 
with the average intensity of audience engagement in the activities associated 
with the label. 
 
Previous work supports this claim. Writing about the arts, DiMaggio (1987) posits 
that a greater degree of interaction among social groups increases the universality of 
systems of classifying art works and other kinds of cultural productions into genres. In 
asset markets, Shiller (1990) argues that popular models for evaluating speculative assets 
are learned through years of common discourse. And Smith (2007) relates the prevalence 
of definitional practices in price-setting markets to the interactive intensity of participants.  
Consensus makes meanings sticky. However, habits of thought and action can be 
challenged by new stimuli, such as new vehicle models that do not fit existing categories 
(Rosa et al., 2005) or new macro-economic developments (Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger, 
2002). Therefore, we recognize that a consensus is not final, even if regularly taken for 
granted. Sensemaking happens all the time in markets, and sometimes leads to changes in 
labels and category schemata (Schneiberg and Berk, 2010).  
  
Convergence of Meanings Through Vanguard Influence in Interaction  
Some audience members might have more influence than others in the emergence of a 
consensus. A diverse set of audience roles are particularly important for creating and 
disseminating labels and categories in markets, including critics (Shrum, 1991; Glynn 
and Lounsbury, 2005), producers (Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000; Jones et al., 2012), 
activists (Rao, Monin, and Durand, 2003; Weber et al., 2008), enthusiasts (Kovacs and 
Hannan, 2010; Fiol and Romanelli, 2012), and highly engaged consumers and users of 
products (Rosa and Spanjol, 2005; Schneiberg and Berk 2010; Bingham and Kahl, 2013). 
We refer to this collection of roles as a vanguard.  
Vanguard members sustain higher levels of engagement in a market; this, 
according to our prior propositions, leads to higher grades of membership in the market’s 
consensus. This is consistent with previous research that shows vanguard members to 
develop subtler, more fine-grained distinctions and more elaborate systems of 
categorization (Mervis and Rosch, 1981; Rota and Zellner, 2007). Vanguard members are 
also more likely to refer to categories when engaging with products (Mitchell and Dacin, 
1996; Cowley and Mitchell, 2003). Furthermore, they might be members of interpretive 
communities (Beunza and Stark, 2004) or communities of practice (Fiol and Romanelli, 
2012), whereby their collective identity spurs them to theorize about the market. They 
might also engage with the products in multiple role capacities, which would contribute 
to a deeper, more elaborated understanding (Fine, 2004).  
Vanguards contribute to the audience-level convergence of meaning in two ways. 
They influence the rest of the audience through direct interaction, and they shape the 
market artifacts the rest of the audience learns from. We elaborate on the first process in 
this section and address the second in the next.  
We begin again with the local situation. Given a pair of interacting agents that 
make sense of a common situation and learn of one another’s meaning repertoires, those 
that learn from a vanguard have a greater increase in their grade of membership. This 
follows directly from vanguard’s greater membership in the consensus.  
Vanguards may also have greater influence in local convergence if other agents 
recognize their vanguard status. If agents are aware that they are interacting with a 
member of the vanguard, they may regard the terminology they learn from them to be 
more consensual. Thus, they may be more likely to use it the next time they engage in the 
market, contributing to its dissemination.  
Moreover, vanguards, more than lay audience members, share and advocate their 
individual repertoires in interaction with others and to seek and create such occasions of 
engagement. Considering art markets, for example, Becker (1982, p. 64) emphasizes the 
role of the artist in influencing how works of art are perceived: “Audiences learn 
unfamiliar conventions by experiencing them, by interacting with the work and, 
frequently, with other people in relation to the work. They see and hear the new element 
in a variety of contexts. The artist teaches them what it means, what it can do, and how 
they might experience it by creating those contexts.” In the domain of cost accounting, 
Schneiberg and Berk (2010) show that associations of manufacturers in various industries 
mobilized their members in the early 20th century to develop a common lexicon and 
categories. Rather than dictating categories top down, the vanguard facilitated interaction 
in the audience, encouraging them to deliberate and build new classifications from the 
bottom up. In this process, cost accountants evolved into “category midwives” rather than 
“category gatekeepers,” creating a permanent role as collaborators of producers and their 
associations in category creation and revision. Dubuisson-Quellier (2013) shows how 
social movement organizations strategically influence both sides of the market interface 
by engaging with consumers and influencing them to incorporate eco-friendly principles 
into their assessments of worth, and then using consumer preferences to convince 
producers to change their behavior.  
Moving to the market level, we conjecture that a vanguard’s influence on the rest 
of the audience increases with vanguard prevalence. This is because (1) the likelihood of 
any audience member interacting with a vanguard member increases with the latter’s 
prevalence, and (2) the salience and visibility of a vanguard to the rest of the audience, 
and therefore the likelihood of any audience member learning vicariously from the 
vanguard increases with their prevalence.  
Proposition 5. Both the level of audience consensus about a label and the hazard 
of subcategory creation within a category increase with vanguard influence. 
 
Proposition 6. The influence of the vanguard increases with the prevalence of 
vanguards in the audience segment. 
 
In addition to prevalence, the level of interaction of a vanguard with the rest of the 
audience determines its influence. Collins (2004) characterizes markets as two separate 
networks of interaction, one of producers and one of the buying public. We expect this 
kind of mutual exclusion among audience members occupying different roles to be rare. 
But it is not unknown: Vanguards such as critics, or fan groups, may shun interaction 
with the rest of the audience. In some music genres, for example, fans with in-depth 
knowledge keep a deliberate distance from commercial music and its classification 
system (Santini, 2011).  
Proposition 7. The influence of the vanguard increases with the frequency of 
interaction of vanguards with each other and with rest of the audience. 
 
Convergence through Vanguard Influence on Intermediaries and Authorities 
In addition to influencing folk classifications through direct interaction, vanguards can 
influence the rest of the audience by shaping the classifications authorized by formal 
authorities. This becomes possible in markets where an authoritative agent can enact, and 
possibly enforce, a particular label or category. A similar dynamic may occur in markets 
with important intermediaries who adopt and disseminate a particular label or category.  
Vanguards often have privileged access to the resources to engage in collection 
action or to influence authorities and/or powerful intermediaries. Lounsbury and Rao 
(2004) find that powerful incumbent producers in the American mutual-fund industry 
were able to shape categories used by industry media because the latter often relied on 
the endorsement and support of dominant players. Kennedy (2008) finds that, even when 
professional norms prevent journalists from accepting payment from or developing social 
obligations with producers, they often rely on firms’ press releases for information.  
Previous work also shows high-status wine producers (Zhao, 2005) and activists in the 
grass-fed cattle movement (Weber et al 2008) to influence formal governmental 
classifications. 
In turn, market participants learn from and adopt formal classifications and 
categories as they engage in the market. Editors and writers of enthusiast magazines such 
as Road & Track, Motor Trend, and Car & Driver, for example, have been influential 
information brokers for the U.S. automotive market (Rosa and Spanjol, 2005). Rosa et al. 
(2005) find that motorcyclists use such journalistic accounts to articulate their own 
preferences, even if they do not always agree with them. In music, when Billboard 
changed its method of collecting information for its weekly performance charts, 
participants’ understanding of the market changed as previously underreported genres 
and records became noticed (Anand and Peterson 2000).  
The strength of vanguard influence on authorities and mediators varies across 
markets. Santini’s (2011) comparison of a folksonomy and a commercial classification 
for music reveals considerable variance across genres in the degree to which these two 
classification systems match. She explains that genres with dedicated fans who establish 
their cultural identities through genre boundaries exhibit a better match with the 
commercial classification because these fans pressure the industry to adapt the 
commercial classification system to their preferred classification system. Likewise, we 
propose that vanguards will be more likely to have a powerful influence on mediators if 
they are greater in number. Thus, Proposition 6 also applies to vanguard influence 
through mediators.  
 
An Empirical Investigation: eBay Auction Markets  
We investigate several of our theoretical propositions using data on 23 diverse product 
markets within the online auction site eBay. These are: “antique furniture,” “antiquities,” 
“folk art,” “US coins,” “digital cameras,” “camera lenses,” “dolls,” “antique dolls,” 
“health,” “model trains,” “Elvis memorabilia,” “drawings,” “prints,” “antique prints,” 
“art photographs,” “other art,” “Pokemon,” “printers,” “printer supplies,” “watches,” 
“antique watches,” “tickets,” and “weird stuff.” These markets were sampled to 
maximize variation in the degree to which items auctioned in them had symbolic value 
and the degree of uncertainty that audiences generally face in evaluating the items. They 
also vary in size, in terms of number of items auctioned and the number of buyers and 
sellers.   
eBay sellers describe their items in a few pages and use a single line auction title 
to attract bidders to their auctions. These item titles are listed by category and the 
subcategories under them. Bidders can either browse titles under certain (sub)categories 
or can search for market-specific keywords (labels) related to what they are looking for. 
Soon after these data were collected, eBay adopted a searchable attribute-based 
classification system for some categories, encouraging sellers to specify the attributes of 
their items and buyers to search for items by indicating value ranges for relevant 
attributes. This dramatic change to the basic categorization system at the site precludes us 
from undertaking a longitudinal analysis of category structures on the site. Instead, we do 
a cross-sectional analysis, using information on category systems and language as they 
existed at the end of our observation period. As a result, our analyses should be 
interpreted as preliminary. 
Interactions among participants on eBay happen directly through chat rooms and 
discussion forums, and indirectly through item descriptions. Casual observation suggests 
that a small portion of participants (likely members of the vanguard) participate in chat 
rooms and discussion forums. Vanguards can influence the categorization system directly 
as well. eBay has a clear interest in its category scheme fitting users’ views; its staff calls 
for input from users before changing the subcategory structure. Users and staff meet 
virtually at a previously announced time in dedicated Discussion Forums to discuss 
possible changes to subcategories.  
Online markets might be considered an unfavorable setting to investigate our 
claims because they are likely not the marketplaces with the most intense, encompassing 
interactions. Moreover, people might prefer face-to-face interaction when they are 
purchasing certain kinds of items. The availability of data on a range of markets that 
share a basic infrastructure, however, makes this a rare and fertile setting for a 
comparative study of markets. Being non-experimental and using cross-sectional data, 
our empirical investigation has some serious shortcomings that we explain below. Yet, 
the analyses make a contribution given the sparse background of comparative research on 
markets (Baker, 1984).  
Data 
We conducted analyses to investigate our claims at the auction level and at the market 
level. Our data include all auctions held in the 23 markets on eBay from April 2000 
through August 2001. We calculate variables on sellers and bidders’ previous 
engagement on the 17 months of data spanning the period until August 31, 2001. 
Variables pertaining to the number of auctions and bidders in the current period 
aggregate information from all 41,490 auctions in these markets that ended on August 31, 
2001. Because this involved intensive manual coding, we calculated variables pertaining 
to label use on a subsample of 1444 auctions conducted on the same day, stratified by 
number of items sellers sold and the markets in which they sold them. This is also the 
subset of auctions on which we run our auction-level analyses. Our market level analyses 
aggregate auction level data to the market level, resulting in 23 observations.  
Dependent variables 
We measure label use by the presence of proper names in titles of items on auction. This 
is akin to coding descriptions of consumer products in catalogues or of art works in 
auction catalogues. For some goods, proper names are brand names. In the “health” 
market, for example, the title “Perfection Shiatsu Massager” contains a brand name, 
while “Total Body Massage Mat” does not. For art, the proper names used in auction 
descriptions are mostly artists’ names. “Cave of Storm Nymphs canvas nudes—Poynter” 
is an example of an item with the artist’s name in its title; “Leda & Swan Greek 
Mythology Nude Sexy Print” is an auction title without any proper names. For both brand 
and artist names, use in single line titles suggests that sellers believe these names convey 
relevant information to prospective buyers. We reason that sellers will use proper names 
as item descriptors only when they expect audience members to understand them. At the 
auction level, our outcome variable is whether an auction includes a proper name in its 
title. At the market level, we calculate the proportion of auctions that have a brand or 
artist name in their titles.  
Category schemas vary in complexity. Our measure of subcategory differentiation 
at the market level is the count of the number of subcategories that are nested under the 
main product market category in eBay. Because the number of auctions in different 
markets is a likely driver of subcategory differentiation, we normalize our measure of 
subcategory differentiation by dividing the number of subcategories by the number of 
auctions in each market category.  
At the auction level, we code the inverse of subcategory differentiation by 
marking the existence of the word “Other” in the subcategory label. We consider auctions 
listed under subcategories such as “Antiques & Art: Antiques: Furniture: Other”, “Coins: 
Dimes: Other”, “Dolls: Antique: Other Antique Dolls”, “Health & Wellness: Dietary 
Supplements: Other”, or “Jewelry, Gems & Watches: Watches: Pocket Watches: Other 
Pocket Watches” as indicating a less elaborate use of the category system relative to 
subcategories such as “Coins: Dimes: Roosevelt (1946-Now)”, “Dolls: Antique: Cloth”, 
“Health & Wellness: Dietary Supplements: Sports Supplements”, or “Printers & 
Supplies: Supplies & Accessories: Laser Toner-Black: Lexmark.” 
In the auction level analysis, we measure appeal as a positive outcome on an 
auction (making a sale) as an indication that an offering had at least moderate appeal. 
Independent variables 
Intensity of engagement. On the buyer side, bidding on auctions is the most elementary 
form of engagement that we can observe. Bidding on an item involves reading item 
descriptions posted by sellers and deciding on an amount to bid. Thus, it involves 
engagement with the labels and category descriptors that sellers use, as well as with 
information and know-how that is relevant for valuation. We measure intensity of 
engagement at the individual level as each users’ total number of bids over the previous 
seventeen months. We represent intensity of audience engagement through frequency and 
stability of bidder engagement. We measure frequency of bidder engagement by the 
median number of items that bidders in the market bid on over seventeen months. We 
measure the stability of audience engagement by the proportion of bidders who bid on 
more than one item over seventeen months. This measure ranges from 0.24 (in “other 
art”) to 0.64 (“Pokemon”) in our sample. 
Vanguard prevalence. We cannot observe activists such as the ones Weber et al. 
(2008) write about, as we do not have systematic data on the direct interaction of 
vanguards with eBay staff. Markets on eBay also do not have the kind of critics and 
analysts that are found in many other markets. We can, however, observe and identify 
three kinds of vanguard on eBay. 
First, we identify super-consumers as “consumers who do a disproportionate 
amount of buying and probably wield a disproportionate amount of influence” (Anderson 
and Engledow, 1977: 186). In product markets, firms consult super-consumers when 
designing new products or marketing plans. Similarly, in art markets, serious collectors 
are treated as opinion leaders by the rest of the audience (Fine, 2004) and they are more 
likely to lead public discussions, and they are more likely to be consulted by authorities.  
We measure the prevalence of super-consumers in markets with the proportion of all bids 
over seventeen months due to the most active bidders in the market. Various cutoffs of 
this measure yield highly correlated measures; we report models including the most 
active five percent of bidders.  As the proportion of bids that come from the most 
engaged of bidders in a market rises, the influence of this vanguard group also rises. This 
measure ranges from 0.21 (“weird stuff ”) to 0.66 (“coins”) in our sample. Not 
surprisingly, this measure is highly correlated (r = 0.55) with stability of audience 
engagement.  
We next identify enthusiasts--those participants that display a symbolic 
engagement with the market--as bidders who have picked eBay user IDs that make 
reference to the eBay market category. We code eBay user IDs such as “elvis*fan,” 
“trainman1,” “print27,” and ‘shortstop” as indicating an identification of the bidder with 
the markets for, respectively, “Elvis memorabilia," “model trains," “antique prints," and 
“tickets”.  We measure prevalence of enthusiasts in markets by the proportion of bidders 
with symbolic user names. This measure ranges from zero (“antique furniture,” “digital 
cameras,” “drawings,” “printer supplies,” “prints”) to 0.20 (“antique dolls”) in our 
sample. Enthusiasts have their personal identities invested in the collective identity of a 
market and regard market engagement in as not only an economic activity but also a 
social one. The symbolic capital of enthusiasts likely makes them more visible targets of 
other audience members’ attention. They might also have greater influence on authorities 
because the latter attribute dedication and focus to them.  
Finally, we identify eBay users who occupy multiple roles in a market. Insiders, 
those who play both roles of seller and buyer, tend to exert more influence because they 
interact not only with buyers (as sellers), but also with other sellers (as buyers). Fine 
(2004) observes that roles are fluid in art markets, as considerable numbers of 
participants take on multiple roles of artist, dealer, collector, and critic either 
simultaneously or at different times. Insiders have more credibility in markets because 
they are considered more knowledgeable (Fine 2004) or more authentic (Carroll and 
Swaminathan 2000). We measure prevalence of insiders with the proportion of sellers in 
the eBay market who also bid on items in the same market over the seventeen months. It 
ranges from 0.07 (“drawing”) to 0.45 (“digital cameras”) in our sample.  
Hypotheses 
Using these variables, we can re-state the implications of the propositions we can test as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 1 (Individual engagement: Propositions 1 and 2). Sellers that engaged 
more as bidders in the market are more likely to (a.) use proper names in item 
titles, and (b.) use more elaborate subcategories when listing their items (c.) 
appeal to buyers.  
 
Although Propositions 1 and 2 apply to all audience members and not only to 
those that also sell, we can observe use of labels and categories only when users auction 
items on eBay. Therefore, insiders are the ones whose behavior we examine in auction-
level regressions. Our next two hypotheses are at the market level: 
Hypothesis 2 (Convergence through engagement; Propositions 3 and 4). Markets 
with greater average engagement by audience members have (a.) proportionately 
greater use of proper names in item titles and (b.) more subcategories per item. 
 
Hypothesis 3 (Convergence through influence; Proposition 6). Markets with more 
prevalent vanguards have (a.) proportionately greater use of proper names in 
item titles and (b.) more subcategories per item. 
 
Results 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the market-level and auction-level variables 
we use in analyses and their correlations.  
[Table 1 about here] 
A principle components analysis of the two engagement measures (frequency and 
stability) and the three vanguard-prevalence measures (of super-consumers, enthusiasts, 
and insiders) at the market level shows that two components account for 89% of the 
variation. The engagement measures load on the first component but not on the second 
component; prevalence of enthusiasts loads on the second component but not on the first 
component; prevalence of super-consumers mainly loads on the second component but 
also partly on the first component; prevalence of insiders, like the engagement measures, 
loads on the first but not the second component. This pattern of loadings confirms that the 
two engagement variables are measuring similar constructs and that the vanguard 
prevalence measures are capturing different constructs.  
We begin by testing Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c at the auction level. As explained 
above, we use data on a sample of 1,444 auctions. The data have a hierarchical structure: 
auctions are listed by sellers, who can list more than one auction; and auctions are listed 
under market categories. We estimate mixed logistic models, using the xtmelogit routine 
in Stata 12 (StataCorp, 2011). This allows us to estimate a “fixed” coefficient for our 
covariates while estimating random intercepts for markets and sellers. Because sellers are 
not completely nested within markets, we estimate “crossed-effects” models, assuming 
that the effect due to the seller is the same regardless of the market that the auction is in.  
The analyses reported in Table 2, Model 2.1, show that sellers that engaged more 
in the market category as bidders were more likely to use proper names in the one-line 
item titles that they used for advertising their auctions. Model 2.2 shows that they were 
less likely to list their auction in a subcategory that contained the word “Other.” These 
findings support Hypotheses 1a and 1b. Model 2.3 shows that insiders were also more 
likely to sell their items, supporting Hypotheses 1c. In Model 2.3, we also estimate the 
effect of label use and subcategory differentiation on likelihood of sale. Auctions listed 
with a proper name have a 36% greater chance of ending with a sale and auctions listed 
in subcategories that are not called “other” have a 32% greater chance of ending with a 
sale. Sellers’ experience of bidding increases the likelihood of sale net of these effects.  
[Table 2 about here] 
In testing Hypotheses 2 and 3, we use fractional logit regressions. Because these 
hypotheses apply to the market level and the data cover only 23 markets, we face an 
obvious problem of small sample size. We therefore perform bootstrap estimation (with 
100 replications). We replicate our results with OLS and robust regressions.  
In all market-level regressions we control for the number of bidders that bid on at 
least one auction during the previous seventeen months (as a measure of demand) and for 
the proportion of auctions that had a fixed price listed (as an inverse measure of 
uncertainty). In regressions on the use of labels, we also control for the number of 
auctions in the market. The dependent variable of subcategory proliferation adjusts for 
this variable by construction.  
Table 3 contains estimates of the effect of audience engagement on label use 
(prevalence of proper names in auction titles) and proliferation of subclasses (ratio of 
subcategories to auctions). Median frequency of engagement (Model 3.1) and stability of 
engagement (Model 3.2) by audience members has a significant positive effect on the use 
of proper names in auction titles, supporting Hypothesis 2a. In Model 3.3, the effect of 
frequency of engagement on the proliferation of subclasses is not significant. In Model 
3.4, the effect of stability of engagement is statistically significant. Therefore, our 
evidence on Hypothesis 2b is mixed.  
[Table 3 about here] 
Table 4 reports estimates of specifications that test our argument about 
convergence of meanings through the influence of vanguards. All three measures of 
vanguard prevalence have a positive significant effect on the proliferation of subclasses, 
but not on label use. This supports Hypothesis 3b and rejects Hypothesis 3a.  
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, we have proposed a theory of consensus in markets that explicitly operates 
at the interface of local market situations and collectively shared meanings. As we build 
on micro theories that suggest individuals collaborate to resolve any ambiguity in local 
situations, we underscore that the motivation to agree on a definition of a local situation 
is not the same as the desire to create or implement a collective consensus. To coordinate 
with others, agents may use shared meanings instrumentally. They can hold potentially 
conflicting meanings in their repertoires. And they focus on achieving a minimal 
agreement in each situation, rather than on finding the best overlap. As a result, we can 
distinguish conventions from social contracts and norms (Lewis 1969; Goffman 1983). 
Conventions can contribute to a market order that is too costly (to be a contract) or 
exclusionary (and thus not legitimate) for some participants. In fact, a majority of 
participants might not favor the consensus.  
Because meanings diffuse through interaction and because vanguards (and the 
artifacts or formal classifications they help build) have greater influence in interaction, 
we can relate market-level factors such as intensity of engagement and prevalence of 
vanguards to the degree of consensus in a market. Thus, while the stability of meaning 
across local situations emerges through local processes of social validation, these 
processes are necessarily influenced by market macrostructures that structure patterns of 
participation. This is a macro-micro interaction that is different from agents enacting the 
meanings that are embedded in cognitive and cultural institutions.  
We see this as one potential direction to develop our theory. Vanguards’ 
connections to rest of the audience and to authorities, regulators, or market intermediaries 
are important determinants of their influence. Further theorization might focus on 
studying how different vanguard roles have different effects on the development of a 
market’s order. For instance, Preda (2005) shows that stockbrokers emerged as a status 
group in various contexts, limiting membership in all instances. We conjecture that while 
the legitimacy accorded to status groups is likely to increase their influence on formal 
classifications, exclusivity of their membership might prevent the spread of labels and 
meanings to the masses. Also left unexplored in this paper are the actions of authorities, 
regulators, or market intermediaries (Fligstein, 1996). Our theory indicates that strength 
of authorities or intermediaries amplify vanguard influence.  
Studying the effect of patterns of participation, rather than the text of that 
participation, forces one to realize the importance of interaction, not only among 
vanguards as in previous studies, but also potentially among lay audience members. 
Previous studies of shared meanings in markets focused on stories found in the media, the 
construction of which most often involves vanguards more than lay audience members. 
Our preliminary findings indicate, however, that while vanguards indeed have influence 
on category elaboration, prevalence of label use may be driven more by average intensity 
of engagement.  
By considering the interactions of lay audiences and of vanguard audience 
members as potentially loosely coupled processes, our theoretical treatment opens 
additional questions: What are the conditions for divergence between lay and expert 
schemas? And how do factors such as credibility, trust, and confidence affect the 
emergence of a consensus? For example, do insiders exert greater influence when product 
features are harder to observe, as with experience or credence goods, as opposed to 
search goods?   
Another key question for future investigation is what conditions are likely to 
cause dissensus in meanings among audience members to emerge and/or persist over time, 
despite the three mechanisms of convergence outlined in this paper. Dissensus may 
emerge when the network structure consists of cliques or disconnected components and 
different components develop diverging “local” meanings. A special case of this occurs 
when different segments of the audience learn from different vanguards. According to the 
theory we developed, subaudience schemas would converge to those of the “local” 
vanguard and thereby diverge globally.  
Dissensus might persist despite exposure of different segments of the audience to 
each other if different audience segments develop divergent but internally coherent 
pairings of labels and schemata. Internal cohesion of these schemata, and in particular, of 
intensional definitions, makes it more likely that local interaction among parties with 
diverging repertoires does not result in convergence (Zelditch 2001). Without 
interdependence among agents involved in the local situation, agents lack the motivation 
to learn from each other, leading those with divergent views to exit the local situation and 
seek other partners whose meaning repertoire have greater overlap with their own. This is 
more likely to happen if collective meanings take on a moral significance and agents 
refuse to employ meanings instrumentally in local situations, for the sake of coordination. 
A special case of this emerges when different vanguards engage in collective 
action to promote their preferred meanings in opposition to another vanguard’s preferred 
meanings. It is also more likely if oppositional identities are associated with each 
audience segment and their consensus. In such cases, even if lay audiences do not take 
sides with any vanguard, disagreement among the vanguards diminishes their influence 
because contestation confuses members of the lay audience about which meanings are 
consensual (HPC 2007: 117-8).  
For instance, Reinecke et al. (2012: 802) find that standard-setting bodies—
significant vanguards—converged on industry-wide codes of good practice, building a 
common vocabulary of sustainability as “the result of mutual observation and dynamic 
interaction among standards organizations.” Yet, the organizations resisted consolidation, 
insisted on maintaining their distinctive identities, and they defended their autonomous 
positions on sustainability standards. This led to a proliferation of subcategories of 
sustainability without attendant consensus at the market level.  
In another example, Negro and colleagues (2011) document a case in which the 
producers of Barolo wines in Italy that use barriques to age their wine (in rejection of the 
regional tradition) refused to accept the label “modernist;” but the critics and the botti-
users insisted that they were. This led to considerable contention about what was the 
authentic Barolo, including public debates among the protagonists and public calls to the 
Consortium to sort this out by creating a “Barolo classic” designation with its own rules. 
While the contestation persisted, the audience was confused about what was “Barolo.” 
During this time, the growing complexity was associated with growing dissensus, not 
consensus.  
Nonetheless, we think that significant divergence will likely not persist in the long 
run in most markets, unless divergent and internally coherent schemata are polarized by 
being associated with oppositional identities. Markets create incentives for subaudiences 
to interact. Furthermore, the presence of a centralized authority or salient intermediary 
makes it more likely that vanguards interact and eventually negotiate common 
classifications (Bowker and Star, 1999). Clearly, we need to learn more about these 
issues. 
Improvement in understanding would also come from better-designed empirical 
studies. Whereas our illustrative investigation shows the benefits of a multi-market 
comparative study, it is compromised by the cross-sectional nature of the data. The 
associations we observe between intensity of engagement in the audience and prevalence 
of label use and between prevalence of vanguards and category elaboration are subject to 
issues of reverse causality and endogeneity. Reverse causality is a threat, in particular to 
the set of analyses on label use. It is possible that markets with well-developed labels 
attract participants over and over again, leading to greater engagement. This, however, 
would run counter to research in market development, which finds that standardization 
encourages more casual and transitory participation in markets (Espeland and Stevens, 
1998).  
Nevertheless, it is possible that some antecedents of audience engagement and 
vanguard prevalence also give rise to shared meanings. We think, for instance, that 
communities of collectors sustain higher levels of audience engagement and vanguard 
prevalence in markets. The variation we find in patterns of participation across markets 
on eBay may reflect that in other marketplaces or community gatherings, where meaning 
convergence happens. However, we contend that this does not diminish the value of our 
empirical investigation. eBay is a decentralized market where the label use we observe 
among users and the category system are likely to be at least partially the result of 
convergence through engagement on eBay. This is corroborated by our auction-level 
analyses. Still, investigation into the co-development of markets and communities would 
be an important direction for future research.   
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
 
Mean 
 
SD. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
Market level variables (N= 23)           
 
1. Prop. of items with proper names in title(t) 
 
.539 
 
.318 
 
1 
       
2. No. of subcategories / no. of auctions .011 .008 .184 1       
3. Median no. bids by bidders [t0, t ) 1.48 .593 .681 .161 1      
4. Prop. bidders who bid on multiple items [t0, t) .447 .119 .755 .275 .849 1     
5. Prop. of bids by top 5% of bidders .467 .136 .080 .418 .424 .551 1    
6. Prop. sellers who also bid [t0, t) .220 .111 .701 .063 .828 .836 .172 1   
7. Prop. bidders with cat.-referencing IDs(t) .065 .064 −.166 .576 .081 .143 .611 -.085 1  
8. ln(no. of auctions[t0, t)) 13.2 1.06 .494 −.028 .692 .694 .369 .710 .201 1 
9. ln(no. of bidders[t0,  )) 12.2 .899 .501 −.156 .513 .514 −.105 .794 −.177 .759 
Auction level variables (N= 1444)           
 
1. Item has proper name in title  
.650  1        
2. Item is listed in sub-category  
      containing the word “other” 
 
.319  -.012 1     
3. Auction ends with a sale .503  .037 −.145 1      
4. ln(no. items the seller bid on in the category in 
        [t0, t) 
1.27 1.99 .118 −.209 .122 1     
5. ln(no. of items the seller auctioned in the 
        category in [t0, t)) 
5.56 3.18 .175 .042 .150 .177 1    
6. ln(no. of items the seller auctioned in the 
        category in t) 
2.29 1.44 .164 .027 −.191 .122 .743 1   
7. ln(seller’s feedback score(t)) 6.84 1.86 .041 .097 −.062 −.059 .680 .446 1  
8. Seller auctions in multiple categories at t .255 .436 −.030 .119 −.157 −.143 .151 .008 .353 1 
9. Seller auctioned in multiple categories [t0, t) .724 .447 −.090 .137 −.093 −.227 .071 −.073 .440 .351 
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Table 2: Coefficient Estimates from Mixed Logistic Models of the Effect of Seller’s Engagement as an 
Audience Member (N=1444) 
 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 
 Proper name used  
in auction title 
Auction listed in 
“Other” 
Auction ended 
with a sale 
Seller’s engagement as an audience member:    
      ln(no. items the seller bid on in the category in 
           [t0, t )) 
.115* −.122* .119* 
(.056) (.064) (.041) 
     Proper name used in auction title 
  .311* 
  (.156) 
     Auction listed in “Other” subcategory 
  −.379* 
  (.168) 
     ln(no. of items the seller auctioned in the category 
         in [t0, t)) 
.112* .021 −.124* 
(.056) (.064) (.044) 
     No. of seller’s auctions in same category at t −.010 
 
−.153 
 
−.385* 
  (.109) (.127) (.082) 
ln(seller’s feedback score(t)) 
.031 .121 .375* 
(.083) (.098) (.067) 
Seller auctions in multiple categories at t −.314 
 
.511 
 
−.941* 
  (.246) (.288) (.198) 
Seller auctioned in multiple categories [t0, t)) −.182 
 
−.144 
 
−.596* 
  (.571) (.290) (.196) 
Intercept −.182 
 
−1.932 
 
−.497 
  (.571) (.924) (.333) 
Random effects parameters:    
    Market level  
3.55 12.1 .114 
(1.29) (5.37) (.086) 
    Seller level 
1.67 1.662 .714 
(.450) (.546) (.226) 
Log likelihood −743.9 −572.7 −897.8 
Wald Chi-squared (d.f) 23.6 (6) 14.0 (6) 88.7 (8) 
* p < .05 (two−tailed test) 
 
 
  
 50 
  
Table 3: Effects of Audience Engagement on Label Use and Subclass 
Differentiation (Bootstrapped Fractional Logit Estimates with 100 
Replications, N=23) 
 Prevalence of label use Subcategory 
proliferation 
 Model 3.1 Model 3.2 Model 3.3 Model 3.4 
Frequency of engagement:     
    Median no. items bid 1.57*  .395  
       on per bidder [t0, t )) (.691))  (.305)  
Stability of engagement:     
    Proportion of bidders that bid   9.75*  3.02* 
      on multiple items [t0, t))  (2.86)  (1.52) 
ln(number of auctions[t0, t)) −.161 −.392   
 (.512) (.373)   
ln(number of bidders[t0, t)) .317 .438 −.325 −.382 
 (.498) (.440) (.262) (.328) 
Proportion of auctions with  1.51 .930 .754 .510 
   a fixed price (2.12) (2.58) (1.21) (1.31) 
Intercept −4.37 −4.66 −1.44 −1.44 
 (3.96) (3.95) (2.94) (3.58) 
Log likelihood −9.94 −9.48 −1.14 −1.13 
 * p < .05 (two-tailed test) 
 Note: Numbers in parentheses are bootstrap standard errors. 
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Table 4: Effect of the Prevalence of the Vanguard on Label Use and Subclass Differentiation 
(Bootstrapped Fractional Logit Estimates with 100 Replications, N=23) 
 
 Prevalence of label use Subcategory proliferation 
 Model 
4.1 
Model 
4.2 
Model 
4.3 
Model 
4.4 
Model 
4.5 
Model 
4.6 
 
Prevalence of insiders: 
      
   Prop. of sellers that bid in [t0, t)) 10.8   15.4*   
 (5.53)   (5.88)   
Prevalence of super consumers:       
   Proportion of bids by the top 5%  .849   2.70*  
       most active of bidders [t0, t))  (3.52)   (1.29)  
Prevalence of enthusiasts:       
   Proportion of bidders with  
 
  −5.27   6.08* 
       market-relevant eBay user IDs   (4.66)   (2.48) 
ln(number of auctions[t0, t)) .115 .357 .751    
 (.483) (.743) (.397)    
ln(number of bidders[t0, t)) −.368 .233 −.196 −.340 −.188 −.104 
 (.663) (.881) (.472) (.290) (.222) (.267) 
Proportion of auctions with a .515 2.89 2.83 1.03 1.51 1.31 
   fixed price (2.60) (3.13) (2.87) (1.42) (1.40) (1.51) 
Intercept .611 −8.85 -8.07 -1.72 -4.11 -4.21 
 (6.04) (3.90) (3.38) (3.16) (2.66) (3.14) 
Log likelihood −10.0 −10.9 −10.7 −1.13 −1.13 −1.12 
* p < .05 (two−tailed test) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are bootstrap standard errors 
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Appendix 1.1 
 
Posted by banddgifts (3363) on Aug-02-01 at 05:38:38 PDT Auctions 
On NDNs, is it still the law that there has to be a full liberty to be called fine? 
 
Posted by pennyman23 (316) on Aug-02-01 at 05:45:47 PDT Auctions 
B&D, I don't know for sure, but I think in some years of the NDN's had a weak strike 
on some of the die's..Therefore I think it would be possible..JMO.. 
 
Posted by dbic (157) on Aug-02-01 at 05:47:29 PDT Auctions 
BandD:Depends whether you're a buyer or seller????? :o) 
 
 
Posted by banddgifts (3363) on Aug-02-01 at 05:52:46 PDT Auctions 
dbic - I bought a 1865 & 1866 listed as fine and fine plus (no pics) from an 
occasional poster here. Asked me 3 times for feedback but neither has full liberty. ;( 
 
Posted by coltom (132) on Aug-02-01 at 06:02:07 PDT Auctions 
Oh no Dbic, we're going to get into that arguement again.  
For Fine, all letters of liberty should be visible, although by Club and Snow grading, 
not necessarily readable. 
The liberty is a bad indication of wear for a fine, as it was often poorly defined 
because of shallow strikes and the such. Conversely, 1865, 1866 was two to three 
years into the master dies, and most master dies produced excellent working dies, 
although because of the copper shortage many were worked to destruction. But, a 
poor die should not be forgiven when superior specimens are abundant. 
 
Posted by dbic (157) on Aug-02-01 at 06:02:52 PDT Auctions 
Morning Jivealott! :)  
BandD; I know I can't sell a fine to another dealer without full LIBERTY..... ANA says 
weak but readable??? Snow says something different??? 
 
Posted by coltom (132) on Aug-02-01 at 06:10:36 PDT Auctions 
Dbic, it is not a big difference. Club grading.  
And you are only talking about the bottom part of the grade. The VG grade is rather 
wide anywhere from three to five letters visible, the Fine grade is very narrow, a 
true fine is a fairly rare coin, as it likely took a few weeks to wear from a VF-20 to a 
F-12 
 
Posted by coltom (132) on Aug-02-01 at 06:15:26 PDT Auctions 
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IN fact, for a DDR 1865 F-12 I would gladly pay $100, even if all the letters were not 
readable. (*Grin* and a little more if they were) 
 
Posted by dbic (157) on Aug-02-01 at 06:15:58 PDT Auctions 
ColTom:I'm not going back into the argument... I will state what I know as fact and 
that is some of the most dingiest and yellowest 2X2s in a show dealers case contain 
IHCs marked Fine without full LIBERTY!!!! 
 
Posted by coltom (132) on Aug-02-01 at 06:18:55 PDT Auctions 
Dbic, lower end of the grade normally are the ones that sit around the most, unless 
you give someone a "bargin" on the coin. 
But, if they are the yellowest 2x2, the obviously people have been grading this way 
for a long long time? 
 
Posted by pennyman23 (316) on Aug-02-01 at 06:20:24 PDT Auctions 
Coltom, Dbic..Didn't mean to stir up an argument here on the NDN's..Just trying to 
help B&D..:)It is rather interesting to hear both sides though..:) 
 
Posted by dbic (157) on Aug-02-01 at 06:24:37 PDT Auctions 
Coltom:Now that I agree with.... "give them a bargain" or in plain English "sell it to 
them as the VG it really is"...... :o) They have been doing it a long time and that's why 
I stated in the beginning "It all depends whether you're a buyer or seller...." 
 
Posted by dbic (157) on Aug-02-01 at 06:27:09 PDT Auctions 
Also,they've been grading them just as long as they have 93-S dollars Fine where 
you can't see the 2 down lines in the cotton bole...... 
 
Posted by dbic (157) on Aug-02-01 at 06:33:32 PDT Auctions 
BandD:The tip of the bust on the 64 L is pointed and not round..... Very easy to 
tell..... 
 
Posted by coltom (132) on Aug-02-01 at 06:35:20 PDT Auctions 
But for the premium, the "L" needs to show. Its easy to tell Obverse 2 from the 
Obverse 3, but you need to see the "L"ongacre 
 
Posted by dbic (157) on Aug-02-01 at 06:36:46 PDT Auctions 
It will show on a coin that's supposed to be fine???? 
 
Posted by dbic (157) on Aug-02-01 at 06:38:30 PDT Auctions 
I just use it as a focal point before I strain to see the L... 
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Posted by coltom (132) on Aug-02-01 at 06:40:35 PDT Auctions 
Now DBIC, I am not sure I will agree with that. That darn L will sometimes show on 
a Good, and sometimes be hard to see on a VF. Its a tiny tiny little thing. 
But you are right, on almost all Fines it should show, as long as you know where to 
tip the coin, and hold the light, and make sure you are facing towards the setting 
sun with your feet pointed to the North and South. 
 
Posted by banddgifts (3363) on Aug-02-01 at 06:42:08 PDT Auctions 
ROFL 
 
Posted by cameo2 (618) on Aug-02-01 at 06:44:24 PDT Auctions 
But only on a Sunday with a Blue Moon ;o) 
 
Posted by dbic (157) on Aug-02-01 at 06:44:58 PDT Auctions 
Morning Mr Cameo Sir!  
ColTom:With you toes pointed straight up in the air..... 
 
Posted by pennyman23 (316) on Aug-02-01 at 06:45:11 PDT Auctions 
Coltom, I thought the feet had to point east and west and you had to hold the coin 
to the north star to get the proper perspective on the "L"..:) 
 
Posted by dbic (157) on Aug-02-01 at 06:48:30 PDT Auctions 
ColTom:I usually pick out the pointed bust and then stick it under the 90X stereo 
scope.... Kinda removes all guess work! 
 
Posted by coltom (132) on Aug-02-01 at 06:56:57 PDT Auctions 
Dbic, yes a 90X stereo does sort of do that. But at shows all I have is my 30x lighted 
single eye  
 
 
Appendix 1.2 
Posted by the_perfect_dark (0) on Aug-01-01 at 04:18:35 
PDT 
Auctions 
I have a question about an item that I'd like to sell. After looking through the 
selection list, 'Antiques' was the most appropriate. I have what appears to be 
a shawl. I'm not sure how old it is, but it is old. It's sewn all over with small 
pieces of silver. This shawl is so loaded with silver that there is no more than 
threads holding it together. It has a couple of small holes, but all in all, it's in 
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very good shape. It does need cleaned but I won't touch it. I'm by no means 
whatsoever comfortable with cleaning it, therefore it's best that I leave it 
alone. It weighs about 8 lbs. I took it to a local dealer and this person was not 
sure of it's age, or origin. He did tell me that it is real silver. I'm really stuck 
with this. I've looked through ebay, hoping to find something similar to it. 
Could anyone please give me any advice on what to do next? Thank you.  
 
Posted by ngraef (1176) on Aug-01-01 at 04:22:44 PDT Auctions 
perfect: I can't help with your item; but there are some who come in throughout 
the day who may be able to. If you could post a link to a picture it would be a big 
help to them. 
 
Posted by finchnest (427) on Aug-01-01 at 06:13:04 
PDT 
Auctions 
Good morning!  
the_perfect_dark From your description, it sounds like you may have a kind of 
scarf called an assuyet. (I'm not absolutely sure of the spelling.) I was told that 
these were popular in the twenties and were exported from Egypt. Do the little 
silver palettes form geometric patterns? Perhaps if you show us a picture, we can 
tell you more? 
 
Posted by marika5 (344) on Aug-01-01 at 06:25:25 PDT Auctions 
the_perfect_dark 
Finchie is right but the spelling is assuit. There are some examples on Ebay 
that you can use to research by going to search at the top of the page.... 
 
Posted by finchnest (427) on Aug-01-01 at 06:27:44 
PDT 
Auctions 
Oh, thank you, marika! I've always wondered how to spell it!  
 
Posted by finchnest (427) on Aug-01-01 at 06:35:40 
PDT 
Auctions 
Groan- I can see I sold the assuit I had way too cheaply! (Gnashing teeth.)  
 
Posted by jred2 (228) on Aug-01-01 at 06:46:26 PDT Auctions 
Marika- really thats true- I've watched some mouthwatering things that 
aren't noticed or spelled right go right up to the last without a bid.LOL! 
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Appendix 1.3 
Posted by crossover (55) on Aug-06-01 at 08:49:46 PDT Auctions 
Coltom: If he gets $50 US for each set, he's doing well. $20 US or in that ball 
park is a fair price. Some people like them for the themes, like cycling, etc. 
Topic specific resales are usually better. But then maybe there's coin shows 
in northern New Joisey where they sell for $10,000.00 a set. Matching 
markets is important.  
Several years ago, I liked Ebay's World Coins: General category for Canadian 
coins. Some very nice buys in there. For about six months, I was hunting in there 
and finding nice deals, without much competition. THEN, others found out about 
people listing in there. At that point I began telling sellers to change categories to 
get maximum value. Those people were not matching the right market, just by 
being in the wrong Ebay category. Got my 1880 wide 0 quarter in there for about 
20% Book Value after I graded it properly. It was F to F+ and not VF. Another 
unattributed variety. That one I knew right away, however.  
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